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MANAGING THE USER RELATIONSHIP IM INFORMATION
SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS: A TRANSACTION
GOVERNANCE APPROACH
Cynthia Mathis Beath
Carlson School of Management
University of Minnesota

ABSTRACT
This paper compares the effectiveness of two mechanisms for governing the relationship
between an information systems development team and the new system's users. This relationship is traditionally governed using phased commitments and user involvement.

Drawing on

the organizational economics literature, the paper proposes a new view in which a project is
characterized as a transaction, or an exchange, between IS and the users. Two alternatives
for governing this exchange, one based on explicit, classical contracting and the other relying
more on implicit, social contracting, are hypothesized
to be differentially effective in
governing exchanges of low or high difficulty, respectively. The model is explored in a field

study at a single site and found to be supported, indicating that more rigorous tests of the
model are warranted.

INTRODUCTION

this multitude is usually condensed to a "virtual
user" who combines some of each characteristic;

Information systems (IS) development projects are a

way of life in MIS departments. On these projects,
project teams composed principally of IS specialists
specify, develop (or obtain) and install an application system for business users in other parts of the
same organization.
There are many stresses and
strains in systems work, but the relationship
between the IS specialists and their organizational

that is, he or she is high enough in the organization to influence the flow of resources and is also a
knowledgeable participant in the business function
to be supported. The term "user" is employed here

in the same sense.

In IS development projects, two things need to be
accomplished in the project/user relationship. First,

colleagues is one of the most problematic. Boehm
(1981) notes that difficulties in this relationship can
double the costs of a project. Since it is the users

to invest organizational resources wisely, the costs
and features of the new system should be agreed

who will ultimately pass judgement on the system,

in the installed system.

and by extension, on the IS function, it would seem
desirable to have a more satisfactory model for
understanding, and thus managing, the relationship
between IS project teams and their user community.
This paper proposes and explores such a model.

The major business users of information systems

upon in advance. Second, the user must find value

That is, it is not enough

that the IS department delivers a system that
matches the specifications. It is also necessary that
the system be useful. The two principal mechanisms

by which we seek to accomplish these goals are

aspects of the systems development life cycle
(SDLC) and user involvement.

include clerical personnel, first-level managers, staff

An SDLC has many features which support the day-

specialists, and higher management (Davis 1974). In

to-day activities of the project team.

the IS literature the term "user" frequently goes

support for investment management, however, lies in

undefined, but it usually includes that person or
exchanged for the system (hence the term "client"

a series of checkpoints at which proposed costs and
features of the system are reviewed by the users,
providing them an opportunity to reconsider the

or "customer"), and (b) will provide or use data
f'rom the new system. In theory and in practice

decision to invest in the system. Beginning with
the initial project authorization, the SDLC takes the

persons who (a) hold or control the resources being
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Its primary

approach based on social contracting, which rests
on a foundation of user involvement.

user and team through a series of agreements.
Increasingly specific documents detail the agreed
upon costs and features of the new system. Change
control mechanisms record addenda to these
agreements. Preference for this gradual and public

A NEW PERSPECTIVE

commitment to IS investments is strong in today's

The organizational economics literature (Barney and

(The principal difficulty with proto-

Ouchi 1986) considers the question of why organiza-

organizations.

tions take one form or another.

typing is that it threatens to violate this norm, and
so prototyping is now seen as an alternative method

It focuses on

transactions, or exchanges of resources, and asks,
"Why are some exchanges carried out within the

of requirements elicitation (Zmud 1980) to be
carried out within an SDLC-type framework of
gradual commitment.)

organization and others outside?"

The opinion of

this literature is that an exchange will require more
elaborate governance mechanisms if the exchange
triggers either or both of two human weaknesses--

User involvement is the other main mechanism used
by project teams to manage the user relationship.
While the efficacy of user involvement has been
difficult to demonstrate (Ives and Olson 1984), it is

bounded rationality (small minds) and self-interest
(hard hearts). Markets are considered to use the
least elaborate governance mechanism (using a
combination of prices, classic contracts and
competition), and clans the most elaborate (based on

believed to result in more accurate user requirements (Powers and Dickson 1973) and to increase

traditions, social agreements and a common world
view) (Ouchi 1980; Williamson 1975; Williamson and

the likelihood that the user will value the system

Ouchi 1981). More elaborate strategies, while more
powerful, are more costly to establish and maintain.
Thus, to minimize governance costs, governance
mechanisms should be matched to the uncertainty
and strategic opportunities in the exchange, which,

(Swanson 1974; Markus 1983). User involvement is

thus an important supporting mechanism for the
agreements produced by the SDLC. That is, user
involvement both improves the quality of the
agreements produced by the SDLC and strengthens

users' commitment to those agreements, increasing
the likelihood that the user will use and favorably

if ungoverned, will cause the exchange to fail or to
be concluded inefficiently.

evaluate the IT investment.
Why is this literature important in managing the

However, user involvement is difficult to implement.
Users have their own jobs to do, and they are not
specialists. User involvement, particularly by those
who are not clients, can muddle rational investment
control. Who should make which decision? How
can user decisions be made visible? Who bears :he
consequences of user-initiated delays or overruns?
Difficulty in resolving these issues discourages user
involvement.

project/user relationship? First, consider that an
internal systems development project implies an
exchange between IS and its user community. That
exchange must be governed to minimize the effects
of bounded rationality and self-interest. This is
accomplished by exchanging information about the

The IS literature acknowledges that gradual
commitment, based on specification of requirements,

project is complex,

costs and features of the system often enough to
monitor the correctness of the investment decision.

If the project is a simple one, this information
exchange can be concluded quite easily. If the
more elaborate governance

mechanisms are needed. Compared to the tradition-

is difficult in the face of complexity, uncertainty,

al view of governing the project/user relationship,

lack of structure, time pressure, and so forth (see

shown in Figure 1, this new view, summarized in

Beath 1983). A variety of alternative mechanisms
are suggested, but they have little theoretical basis

Figure 2, is not radically different but does include
some interesting additional implications.

and have not been widely accepted. This paper
draws from the organizational economics literature
those more

The sources of project difficulty in Figure 2 include
not only the usual uncertainty and complexity issues

difficult projects. A model is proposed in which a

(small minds issues, for the most part), but also

traditional SDLC-based approach is appropriate for
in
project/user
relationship
governing
the
straightforward projects, as expected.
More

considerations of previous and future exchanges
(hard hearts issues). Previous investments relevant

to the current exchange -- such as IS training in a

challenging projects, however, require a governance

particular technology -- or ignorance

for some advice on what to do about
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of future

Sources of difficulty

Sources of difficulty

Outcomes

Size

Org Context

Complexity

On time

Technology
Lack of Structure

Outcomes
Uncertainty

8

C

Lack of project

On schedule
All features

specific knowledge

D

Short term view

User satisfaction

Time Pressure

d

Good tradeoff choices
based on timely,
low cost information

SDLC plus (sometimes)

User involvement

Market
Quasi-market
Matrix

Approaches

Clan

Approaches

Figure 1. How to Manage the Project/User
Relationship: The Traditional
View

Figure 2. How to Manage the Project/User
Relationship: The Transaction

payouts from the current exchange make design
choices, and thus project investment decisions, more
problematic. For one thing, prior investment may

but mutually understood agreements, and the hard
hearts problems are dealt with by a sense of
personal obligation and commitment.
Matrix
governance involves shared responsibilities, more
frequent checkpoints and contact with users, and
social assessment of progress and outcomes, which
may continue beyond system installation.

Governance View

activate self-interest by creating sunk costs or
small numbers bargaining situations. For another, a

short term view is a disincentive for investing in
more elaborate governance.

The list of potential project/user governance
mechanisms could be quite lengthy, as any approach
equal to the "small minds" and "hard hearts"

In the new view, the objective of a project/user
governance mechanism broadens from "delivering all

problems of a particular project would qualify.
Market governance would be appropriate when
purchasing software from vendors. Clan governance
is perhaps appropriate for end-user computing. The
SDLC approach to exchange governance discussed
above is equivalent to quasi-market governance.
Quasi-market governance is basically an internal
market, in which prices and contracts are used to

features on time and on budget" to "providing
information regarding the expected value of the
project effectively and efficiently." The former
goal is meaningful only when the quasi-market mode
is in operation.
Thinking more generally, the

objective is to erect and maintain a way to share
information with the user so that investments in

information technology will be made judiciously.

control small minds problems and the employment
relation controls hard heart problems. It includes

Enough information must be provided for both
parties to make good choices on a timely basis and
at least cost. A proper match between project
characteristics and governance mechanism results in
the proper generation of information needed to

several classic contract notions: prespecification of
acceptance
criteria,
infrequent
checkpoints,
measurement of progress and costs by comparison to
written, explicit agreements. Another possible

governance approach is matrix governance (Beath
1983).
Matrix governance is based on social
contracting notions, in which the small minds
problems are dealt with in implicit, weakly specified

govern the investment decision. A mismatch, on
the other hand, will be costly, generating either
insufficient or irrelevant information.
summarizes this contingency relationship.
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Figure 3

Prolect Difficulty

Project Size and Uncertainty

High

Low

Unsuccessful

Unsuccessful
Governance mechanism

Successful

based on

Quasi-market
governance mechanism

,
insullicient information)
(Not effective --

classic contracts
Unsuccessful

Governance mechanism

based on
social contracts

'

Successlul

(Too expensive --

Matrix
governance
mechanism

S

(Not effective insufficient information)

Successful

(Cor,trolled progress,

irrelevant information)

Successful
(Controlled progress,
good trade-offs)

Unsuccessful
(Too expensive irrelevant information)

good trade-oils)

Low

High

Figure 3. A General Model for Managing
the User Relationship

Figure 4. An Exploratory Model for Managing
the User Relationship

The general argument is that while low difficulty
projects are amenable to governance with classic

support of a full range of business functions. Of
the fourteen projects, four were selected for in-

contracting approaches embedded in the SDLC, more
difficult projects require an approach which matches

depth examination and exploration of the model.

difficulty in specification to a set of acceptable

This paper uses those four cases to explore three
questions:
1) Is proper matching of governance
mechanism to project difficulty necessary for effec-

social contracts.

That is, the SDLC approach may

be a good way to govern some projects.

Another

way, matrix governance, relies on user involvement
to provide a foundation for hammering out social

contracts and is better for the tough projects.

tive governance of the project/user relationship? 2)
Can difficult projects be effectively managed with
matrix governance? 3) What are the consequences
The case study approach is
of a mismatch?

It

seems likely that some IS project managers sense
this and behave accordingly. Hence, references are

particularly appropriate in this situation, as the

made to matrix-type techniques in the IS literature
(Beath 1983), and we might expect to find IS

phenomena of interest are quite complex, difficult

project managers using matrix governance techniques, but without a framework which legitimatizes

numbers, and the model being explored is still in
the inductive stage. The objectives of the research

to remove from the work context and occur in small

The model
proposed here attempts to rectify this situation.

are to enrich the model and to determine whether

THE STUDY

mechanisms of interest in this initial exploration

The information systems organization of ORM is
typical of many systems development departments in
large corporations. The operating environment is
IBM and IBM-compatible; COBOL is the principal
IS reports to the
application system language.
financial vice president, and the systems development group's functional organization mirrors ORM's

were quasi-market and matrix; the project charac-

organization.

them or focuses them appropriately.

to pursue testing it using more costly methods.

In the expectation that some IS project managers
were already using matrix approaches, a field study

was conducted to explore a reduced version of the
model in Figure 3 (Beath 1986).

The governance

tainty. Thus, the exploratory model (Figure 4) is
more limited than the general model. The field
study examined fourteen recent projects at an oil
refining and marketing company, called ORM here,
using both quantitative and qualitative techniques.

The

projects

were

typical

MIS applications,

emphasizing development of online

applications in

At the time of the study, develop-

ment projects were measured on schedule and cost
performance, with schedule performance receiving
the most attention.

teristics of interest were project size and uncer-

Policies on governance of the project/user relationship at ORM could be characterized as laissez-faire
Project authorizations were
in many respects.
required for development projects requiring more
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But project managers were given the

nological complexity and social complexity were
computed. Size included measures of the number of
work months, the elapsed time, and the number and
size of subsystems to be developed. Technical
complexity included consideration of mode (batch or
online), degree of distribution of process or data,
and the number of computers and peripherals

discretion to use SDM/70 as they saw fit; typically
they searched the material for methods, forms and
techniques they felt would be useful on a particular
project. No policy governed user involvement on
the projects studied. User liaisons were frequently
designated on projects, but the responsibilities of

involved in the system. Socia/ complexity included
measures of the severity of procedural changes
required in the user area, the number of users, the
newness of the technology to the user, the attitude
of the user towards computing and the commitment
of the user management to the new system.

than six months to complete, but some authorizations were signed just prior to completion. Systems
development standards were embodied in SDM/70
(SDM/70 no date), a purchased set of forms and
methods espousing the typical SDLC or quasi-market

approach to governance of the project/user retationship.

user liaisons varied considerably.
managers were IS professionals.

All

project

All fourteen projects were officially on time,

Overall, it appears that at ORM, as in many similar
IS departments, project management is considered

an art, not a discipline.

Deviations from strict

SDLC norms are tolerated at ORM, especially in the
blurring of phases, informal accommodation of
changes, and manipulation of budget and schedule
records. Thus, it was expected that some projects
at

ORM

might

use

a

project/user

governance

mechanism that deviated from the usual quasimarket approach, incorporating
matrix mechanisms.

or

substituting

Project/user relationship governance on the fourteen
projects in the study was evaluated using interviews
with project managers and reviews of project
documents. Key indicators of social contracting at
ORM were reliance on social assessments for
progress and completion, the extension of service

reflecting, no doubt, the emphasis on schedule
performance; budget variance ranged from +13% to
- 12%. To measure the adequacy with which the

project/user relationship was managed on these
projects,

ORM's

six

systems

and

programming

managers were asked to rate each project on six

Among these were two attributes
relating to the objectives of the project/user
attributes.

governance

mechanisms:

(1)

display controlled

progress -- throughout the project, the status of
the project schedule, budget and features to be
delivered are communicated clearly to all stakeholders and
(2) make good tradeoff choices-between cost, schedule and requirements, particularly with respect to technical issues of design,
development and implementation.

Recall that the

objective of the project/user governance mechanism
is to exchange cost and benefit information so that
appropriate tradeoff decisions can be made.

beyond phase termination date, and delays in

Of the fourteen projects initially examined, four

signing project authorizations.

were selected for comparative examination of the
exploratory model. The projects were selected to

Particular attention

was also paid to user involvement as an important
supporting mechanism for social contracting.

Key

discriminators of user involvement at ORM were the

represent a variety of relationships between
outcomes, governance mechanism and project

degree of responsibility for project activities taken

by the user, inclusion of project involvement in
user's performance reviews, and the "earliness" of

difficulty. Two "successful" projects (rated second
and third by the managers) and two "unsuccessful"
projects (rated twelfth and thirteenth) were se-

user involvement (late involvement does not provide
a foundation for agreements).

lected. (Documentation on the best and worst
projects was much more limited.) The two successful

projects appeared to be examples of appropriate
uses of quasi-market and matrix governance,
Among the fourteen projects examined the typical

respectively, and they are called Good-Q and Good-

project lasted about fifteen months, and cost about

M, below. The two unsuccessful projects, called
Bad-Q (apparently quasi-market governance) and

$600,000.

Indications of project relative size and

uncertainty were drawn from the project's risk
analysis, a form completed at the beginning of each
project similar to one described by McFarlan (1981;
Dallas Tire Case 1980). Measures of size, tech-
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Bad-? (apparently no governance) provided an
opportunity to explore the limits of the model.
Figure 5 indicates where the four cases fit into the
model.

system (merely reading a file), is logically straightforward, uses familiar, established technology, and
is not critical to normal business activities. Retail
Marketing, the client, was the only "user," and the

Project Size and Uncertainty

High

Low

Good-Q

Quasi-market
governanco mechanism

Bad-Q

new system

{Expidid outcome:

(Exp clid outcome:

SucceutuD

Unsuccesslul)

total project a low risk rating, which proved to be
accurate," says the PCR.

( Good-M

Matrix

governance mechanism
(Expected outcome:

(Expeaed outcome:

Unsuccesstul)

Successtul)

No governance mechanism
(Expected outcome: Unsuccessful}

required neither structural changes to

the organization nor significant changes to daily
operations. "Overall the Risk Analysis did give the

Nancy, the project
Quasi-market Governance.
manager for Good-Q, is quite familiar with standard
system development techniques, and relies on them.
"Good-Q followed the SDM/70 project life cycle
methodology and guidelines," says the PCR.

Bad-?

Following SDM guidelines, user involvement in the
project emphasized information sharing, not
responsibility for project tasks. Relevant marketing
Figure 5. Summary of Case Results

and accounting personnel were interviewed in the
requirements phase. Later these same individuals
reviewed a specification document describing the

Case descriptions of the four projects were

proposed system. A user liaison reviewed results of

developed from previously obtained material and
supplemented by additional interviews with project

the acceptance test.

personnel and other observers and by examination

Two project authorizations were signed for this
project, both in a timely fashion. The first was

of project documents, such as project documentation
The four
and Project Closing Reports (PCR's).
cases are described below, followed by a discussion

signed quite near the beginning of the project
covering

the

development

of

a

specification

of the lessons from the cases for governance of the

document; the second was signed early in the

project/user relationship.

development activity. Good-Q was completed on
schedule, relative to the plan presented in the

THE CASES

second project authorization, and two months ahead
of original estimates. Similarly, project costs were
only slightly over the authorized budget (+3%) and

The Second Rated Project -- Good-Q

17% below original estimates.

This highly rated project seemed at first to be a
straightforward example of appropriate use of quasi-

Of the fourteen projects examined in this research,

market governance in a low

schedule and budget are shorter and smaller than
the original schedule and budget estimates. On

uncertainty situation.

Closer examination, however, reveals some
esting twists.

inter-

this is the only one on which the authorized
closer examination, however, it is clear that the

According to its Project Closing Report (PCR), "The

definition of "complete" for Good-Q meant that the
programs were operational, not that they were being

objective of [Good-Q] was to provide Retail

used for business purposes. The following passage

Marketing with an on-line computer

from the PCR reflects Nancy's argument that the

system for

tracking and reporting expenditures against estimated and committed amounts." The new system
replaced an existing manual process.

Low Uncertainty. Compared with other projects at
this site, Good-Q was small and had low technical
and social complexity. The Good-Q project was
completed in seven months and cost $165,000. The

new system has one passive link to a financial
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Good-Q project should be regarded as completed:

The Good-Q system was signed-off by
Retail Marketing on November 14,
was
paperwork
1984. . . .Implementation
submitted on November 15, 1984. The
start-up database was loaded on November
20, 1984, using available data....The gradual
process of moving programs, JCL, data

sets,

libraries,

etc.,

from

test

In this way, governance mechanism and project
characteristics are successfully matched.

to

production took place during the last
week of November. The installation

was completed by November 29, 1984,

and the system run in production on

The Third Rated Project -- Good-M

November 30, 1984.

However, user training was conducted a few

months following this date, and business use of the
system did not begin until well into 1985. Ap-

parently the day-by-day description of the wind-

On this challenging project, heavy user involvement
provided a foundation for social contracting. But,
as shown below, the project manager also considers
some aspects of the quasi-market approach to be
important to project success.

down of the Good-Q project demonstrates Nancy's
success in

convincing MIS and user management

that the project team's responsibility was to get the
code running on the computer, and that it was the
user's responsibility to use it.

During the interview, Nancy contrasted the ef-

1984), being evaluated by the department. "PDM/80
doesn't have rigorous controls. SDM lets you finish

fuzzy.

to the next.

Good-M

project

modified

the

company's

dollar real-time application, called PMS here, which
The
scope of Good-M included fulfillment of several
outstanding enhancement requests, but its driving
was under development at the same time.

fectiveness of SDM/70 for project control with a
prototyping methodology, called PDM/80 (PDM/80
one step before moving

The

customer system to support a new multi-million

PDM/80 is

SDM much more clearly defines the dif-

ference between phases: She continued, "There has

to be that instant in time when you release the
system to be in production. PDM/80 misses that."

When asked what contributed to the successful
control of progress and the making of tradeoff

decisions on Good-Q, Nancy cited "rigorous applica-

force was the PMS project. The project authorization's return on investment box says, "Not

applicable -- PMS prerequisite." The project was
funded, along with the PMS project, by a high leveI

steering committee.

A Difficult Project. The Good-M project lasted
twenty months and cost just under $1,000,000; at
this site, that is a large project.
Technical
complexity was very high; PMS was the company's

first attempt to implement a real-time system.
Social complexity was also high, due in part to

heavy

interdependence

with

the

PMS

project.

tion of SDM/70 techniques" and "keeping in very
close touch with the team, so we could always tell

impacted by the Good-M project (1) I/0 Control,

In her opinion, a good relation-

who gave up responsibility for maintaining the

where we were:

ship between the project and the user depends on
satisfactory completion of the formal agreement,

and satisfactory completion of the formal agreement
rests on close control of the project team.
The exploratory model indicates that quasi-market
governance will successfully mitigate small amounts
of project difficulty. It appears that in this case

the mitigation occurs in an unexpected way. That

is, Nancy began with the assumption that quasimarket governance would be used. Then, to the
extent necessary, she retro-fitted the project to be
manageable under that constraint, including scoping

the work to be done so that it ended with delivery

of the programs to a computer. The management of

the IS department is familiar with Nancy's style and
values it, assigning her to manage smaller, less
technically complex projects, in full confidence that
they will be completed on time and within budget.
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Beyond PMS, two additional groups of users were

customer database, and (2) people throughout the

company who took on this responsibility.

This
group, including people at field offices, regional
marketing offices, zone offices, refineries, and
headquarters, was represented on Good-M by a set
of "coordinators:

Matrix Governance. The Good-M project had very
high user involvement on several fronts. Good-M
project team members met daily with representatives

of the main PMS development team and two other
PMS support projects.
In effect, Good-M had

"users" who were capable of and interested in
participating in detail design and programming.
Standards and data definitions were shared, and the

bulk of the planning for testing and installation
were carried out jointly. A user liaison (from I/0

Control) and the coordinators were heavily involved

in the requirements definition, systems test and

implementation of the new customer database. The

coordinators were given the opportunity to try to

Oscar, the project manager, discussed governance of

"crash" the system for about three weeks, which
provided a healthy measure of exercise for the new

project/user

In

relationships.

his

view,

user

involvement can be difficult to obtain for several
reasons.

system. The user liaison led the training process.

First, as in this case, users may be

geographically dispersed.

Second, the most know-

The Good-M project apparently made extensive use
of social contracting within a framework of a single

ledgeable users have their own jobs to perform.
Third, users may fear automation, or may have had

No project author-

bad experiences working with analysts in the past.

ization covered the development of requirements, a
violation of local standards. The single project
authorization, for $1.1 million, was signed after the

So Oscar says that one must work very hard to
establish trust with the users. On this project, he

large project authorization.

visited numerous user sites, watched and listened
during the day, and took people to dinner, listening

requirements were completed.
Subsequently,
however, changes to requirements needed for PMS
were accommodated throughout the project. The
PCR says, "In September, 1983, the requirements
were frozen." The PCR then goes on to describe a
lengthy series of changes originating from the PMS
project. Finally, it says, "During the final inte-

some more. "You have to know who they are and

He spoke
frequently on the phone with users, "but nothing
beats one on one."

how they communicate," he says.

Oscar is motivated by a generalized notion of

gration and acceptance testing phase, changes were

investing in future payoffs when he establishes

still being received from the PMS teams."

relationships with users. When other analysts are
only gathering requirements information, Oscar is
"building trust."
On this foundation, informal
agreements can be made easily and quickly accord-

Good-M's project authorization does not include a

schedule; of the project authorizations reviewed,
this is the only one without a proposed delivery
date. The PCR, however, makes reference to an

ing to Oscar. Oscar also stressed the importance of
formal agreements. "Each has its own place," he
"They make up a system of checks and
says.
balances. Things like requirements documents keep

"original" plan and a "revised" plan. The PER says,

people honest.

Without that you'd get so

it would be chaos."

The Programming and Implementation
Phase was originally scheduled to be

sloppy,

Overall, in his view, formal

agreements set the limits for the investment, user
involvement provides an opportunity for mutual

completed in April, 1984. However, due to

the many uncertainties surrounding the

trust, and the trust allows the details of the

new PMS environment and the continuous
changes requested by both the PMS teams
and on-going business operations, the
was extended to
implementation phase
July 12,1984.

investment to be worked out informally.

The Good-M project and Oscar's philosophy support
the model. Oscar achieves success by using SDLCtype authorizations and documents for the organizational legitimacy they provide and as an umbrella
under which he works more informally, relying on

The project manager said that the revised schedule

personal relationships, mutual trust, and shared

was agreed to by "all parties" just prior to the new
July due date, well after the original April due date.

understanding of goals.

department
This
agreement
notwithstanding,
performance reports record Good-M complete as of
December, 1984, "on time."

The Twelfth Rated Project -- Bad-Q

This project was relatively difficult, and the
inexperienced project manager hoped that rigorous

Pinpointing the cost performance of Good-M is
equally difficult. The total costs of the project are
reported to be 10% under budget. There is also a
note that about 8.6% of the total charges for GoodM are for "PMS support: The PCR also notes that
much overtime -- roughly equivalent to the 1096
underrun -- was needed to meet the schedule.

application of the quasi-market governance tech-

niques she had learned would minimize the conse-

quences of that difficulty.

Unfortunately, things

Maintenance costs on this
did not work out.
system were high, and the system suffered from
complexity due to late design changes. The project
also apparently suffered from bad public relations.
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The objective of the Bad-Q project was to replace a

batch operational control system used at the

would have handled a design improvement in this
manner.

refineries with an enhanced online/database system.

The project was funded by the headquarters'

As a result of a scope change at the end of the

Refining Department, as are all data processing

requirements phase (from batch updating to online

systems used at the refineries.

For several years

updating), the requirements had to be partly redone,

h.eadquarters had been attempting to make the

and the first project authorization was officially

administrative processes used at the refineries more
uniform. Common computer systems are seen as one

overrun. (A more experienced manager might have

way of achieving this objective. In addition, the
business users affected by this system included not

only the refineries, but also marketing field offices.
Relatively Difficult.

The Bad-Q project started in

June, 1981, and took twenty months to complete at
a cost of about $635,000. Relative to other ORM
projects, Bad-Q is just above average in size. This

was the first of a series of similar replacements,
and thus was a proving ground for several new
technologies.
The project team was relatively
inexperienced, leading to high technical complexity.
Social complexity of Bad-Q was also high; not only

was the user community large and dispersed, but
implementation of Bad-Q implied
changes to
organization structure and jobs at the refineries.

included the additional work in the next phase.)
Increases to cost and schedule of subsequent phases
required by the increased scope were included on
In the end,
the second project authorization.
however, the project was nearly 1096 over author-

ized budget, with the overrun about equally divided
between the two halves of the project. Only two

of the fourteen projects officially overran their
authorized budgets by more (by about 12% in both
cases). Little effort was made to hide the overrun.

"I know a lot more now," Jane said, ruefully.
When asked what went wrong, Jane replied, "This
project didn't get the attention it deserved, from
She
the refinery, from marketing, from IS."

contrasted this with her next project, which was
"On MMM we had so much
You need
commitment and energy from the users."
over twice the size:

user involvement.

Quasi-Market Governance. In the requirements
phase, users at all refineries were interviewed,
following SDM guidelines. When the requirements

were complete, design reviews were held at the
refineries.
User involvement was more intense
during implementation. Refinery personnel used the
new communications network to participate in the
system test long distance, so to speak. According
to Jane, the project manager, "The network allowed

us to demonstrate our system to users in the

refineries ....In doing so we were able to give the
users first-hand knowledge of the system operation
and obtain feedback from them during our testing
phase." This involvement was found to be extremely useful in finding errors, but provides little
foundation for social contracts.

In the contracting arena, it seems fair to say that
Jane, managing her first project, made a sincere
effort to conform to quasi-market expectations for
project/user governance. Two project authorizations and one development change request were

signed for Bad-Q.

Bad-Q's was the only develop-

ment change request signed among the fourteen
projects examined in this research. It covered a

design improvement suggested by the project team;
in the opinion of another manager, only a novice
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It was wonderful.

At the end of the project, in Bad-Q's PCR, Jane

made a number of recommendations for future
refinery-based implementations. Some involved the
use of tools and techniques, but many others can be
interpreted as a call for larger investments in

establishing matrix governance mechanisms. With
respect to user involvement she said, "If this type

of cross-functional effort is to be undertaken in
other projects,

it is

my

recommendation that

specifications be developed with heavy user
involvement from all organizations: And elsewhere,
"it

is

important

to

train

both

users

and

data

processors in order to facilitate [future] refinery
implementations."
Generally, she advocates a
longer, fuzzier implementation schedule, with some
burn-in time at the first site, or a "post-implemen-

tation follow-up" -- a sort of mop-up operation.
These make the delivery date harder to establish

and violate quasi-market principles. Finally, she
advocates more involvement by the refinery
computing staff throughout development (as opposed

to just during the installation of the programs) "in
order to cut travel costs on future projects." That
is,

raising

the

level

of

expertise

of

refinery

computer operators on one project could reduce
development costs on subsequent projects.

In terms of the model being examined, it seems

document itself.

likely that the problems on Bad-Q stemmed from
insufficient early user involvement and too much
reliance on quasi-market governance to deal with
uncertainty. The model suggests that attempting to
govern a difficult project with quasi-market
mechanisms will result in a less than optimal return

the project manager, "the Guru was closeted."

"During programming," said Sara,

Relations between Sara and the Guru were difficult.
Sara is a business analyst, not a technician, and the
Guru is a "brilliant, private, arrogant genius,"

according to one observer. They did not commun-

on investment, owing to suboptimal tradeoff

icate.

decisions and increased costs of rework.
of both are indicated in this case.

handled, Sara commented "After we agreed on a
change, he just changed the code, or made a note

Evidence

In talking about how change control was

in the online file of system documentation. I never

saw anything:

From her point of view, he was

The Thirteenth Rated Project -- Bad-?

secretive.
In one outsider's view, she was not
his designs.
technically strong enough to grasp

Apparently neither matrix nor quasi-market ap-

Sara admitted freely that she had no idea how the
Guru's programs worked.

proaches were used on this small and relatively
straightforward project.
The outcome, not unexpectedly, was unsatisfactory.

Sara did not make extensive use of formal contracting on Bad-?. Five months after starting work and

The Bad-? project developed an online system to

six weeks before the projected implementation, a

maintain and access data common to several crude

project authorization for $132,000 was signed.

oil supply systems. The new system consists of
several data tables (containing the common data)

appears that, at that time, this was expected to be

and a rule database (governing the maintenance of
and access to the data). The project was initiated
and funded by a steering committee of managers in
Two other
the crude oil supply department.
projects under development at the same time were
expected to use the Bad-? database.

project.

Relatively Easy. Bad-? was completed in eleven
months and cost about $230,000. The project team
included

the

project

manager,

an

independent

the only project authorization for the entire
However, a few weeks later, when most,

but not all, of the programming was complete, the
Guru became involved in a dispute with management
over another issue and quit. Two months later
(after the expected implementation date), a
supplementary project authorization for $90,000 was
obtained. It stated "A significant Dortion of this
additional work has been
reauired due to the

deDarture of a kev contract analvst at a critical
point in this Dro iect" [underscore in original].

contractor with excellent technical skills, known as
"the Guru," and two other programmer/analysts.
The project was small, and its technical complexity
was low (particularly in the hands of the Guru), as

It

The

remainder of the team finished the project within
the new schedule and budget.

Because of the delivery delays on Bad-?, one of the

was its social complexity. The principal users of
the system were the members of the two teams

common database had to build its own files.

two projects which were supposed to use the

expecting to use the Bad- ? database. Other users
were those who would maintain the file entries and

second project was scrapped for other reasons.
Some subsequently developed systems use Bad-?, but

The

rules, but as the files were small and stable, there

it was the opinion of one manager that Bad-?

was little impact on the task environment of these

served little useful purpose. Very little of the data
was common, and the effort involved in adding new

users.

tables to the Bad-? system is roughly equivalent to

putting a table into an application.
No Project/User Governance Mechanism.
involvement on this project was very low.

User
The

design of the interfaces between Bad-? and the
systems

expecting

to

use

its database

was

left

Maintenance

costs are high.

Sara thinks that the problem on Bad-? was that the
Guru tried to build an overly complicated system,

mostly to the Guru, as it was felt that most of the
constraints were at the Bad-? end of the interface.
The business users attended a presentation on the

"to try to provide too far out into the future:

design,

were not in sync.

but

did

not

review

the

specification

The Guru's objectives for the system and the

company's objectives for the system, in her opinion,
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controls boils down to no governance. Furthermore,

ally useful. As the uncertainty of projects undertaken in MIS departments increases (with the easy
projects undertaken by users and information
centers or with purchased software), more effective
mechanisms for managing difficult projects will be

it appears that governance of the user relationship

required.

was undermined by an absence of governance within

part of the solution is judicious user involvement
and mastery of social contracting techniques.

Governance of the project/user relationship on Bad-

? seems to be characteristic of neither matrix nor
quasi-market approaches.
Rather, user apathy
combined with a suspension of normal project

That is, without sufficient
familiarity with the costs and features of the
the project team.

The results of this research suggest that

system, Sara could not communicate those to her
user community, and could not suggest appropriate
tradeoffs.

The cases also show how difficult it can be to make
development
situation
an
intra-organizational
conform to quasi-market expectations. In only one
case (Good-Q) were costs (in the project authoriza-

A quasi-market approach might have been appropriate for this project, according to the model
being tested here. In fact, this seems to have been
a situation in which a formal contract with the
Guru, or pure market governance, would have been
desirable.

tion) and features (in requirements documents)
controlled in the same organization.

In two cases

(Good-M and Bad-?), primary users were within IS,
while contracts were with steering committees. In
Good-M and Bad-Q, users were hierarchically,
geographically and functionally dispersed. In no

case were the future maintainers of the systems
considered "users: Wearing quasi-market blinders,
we see only those users with whom we have formal
contracts, and simply ignore all others. There is no
way to take them into account.

SUMMARY

Examination of the Good-Q and Good-M projects

confirms that these two cases conform to the
model's predictions.
Concerning Bad-Q, over
reliance on quasi-market approaches penalized both
Bad-Q and future refinery projects because design
errors were made and opportunities for investments
in matrix governance were forgone. Bad-? appears
to have suffered from an absence of governance of

The cases show that IS project managers need to
master a variety of governance techniques, which
can be matched to a variety of exchange charac-

teristics. The project can be seen as the nexus of
many exchanges, each requiring some kind of
governance, with users who finance projects, users

While the use of a convenience sample precludes
drawing any conclusions regarding the accuracy of

who submit or maintain data, users who access the
data, and also with data processing operators, data
control clerks, program or database maintainers, and
IS management. As IS is called upon to build more
information systems that provide strategic linkage
across subunits, the "virtual user" approach will

the model, these cases, taken as a group, offer

become increasingly unsatisfactory.

preliminary indications that the model warrants
closer examination. It does appear that governance

The mastery of social governance techniques re-

the project/user relationship.

Without governance,

cost overruns and specification failures are not
unexpected.

mechanism and project difficulty should be matched
for effective governance. The appropriateness of

using

the

two

governance

mechanisms

quires. first, their legitimation.

This

research

motivates that legitimation process. The project
managers interviewed for this study all agreed that

being

evaluated -- quasi-market and matrix -- for dealing
with low and high project difficulty, respectively, is
mismatch
The consequence of a
supported.
between quasi-market governance and project
difficulty is a predictable lack of effectiveness.

social contracting was both useful and necessary,
but none seemed to think it was quite "right."

Some IS managers dismiss efforts to build trust with
users as wasteful "schmoozing." By studying the
appropriate role of social contracting, we can learn
to apply these techniques in a controlled, organizationally acceptable manner.

Most of the MIS literature emphasizes the design
improvement potential of user involvement and the

SDLC. But, here we see that both of these are also

tools of governance, that each one has a limited

One important step in the legitimation process is to
clarify objectives for the project/user relationship.

range of effectiveness, and that neither is univers-

This study emphasizes the view that managing that
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relationship means locating and sharing the cost and

narrowly defined exchanges should be examined from

feature information needed to manage an investment
in computing. Delivery of a particular product, at

both the user and IS perspective.

some prespecified cost and schedule, is a reasonable
objective only if the relationship is amenable to
quasi-market governance.

should be specifically addressed in future research.
effectiveness of other
Finally, the range of
governance options, such as classical contracting,
should be pursued.

The impact of

past and future exchanges on project difficulty

Another important step in the legitimation process
is to distinguish between the costs to estab/ish a
governance mechanism (roughly speaking, a one-time

cost), and the costs to operate a governance
mechanism (e.g., recurring costs).

At present, it is

difficult to separate those costs on IS projects.
Our quasi-market habits make us blind to oppor-

tunities

for

investing

in

future
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